The Procedural Impact of an Environmental Impact Statement on Judicial Review by Poon, Ashley
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 43 | Issue 1 Article 9
2-12-2016
The Procedural Impact of an Environmental Impact
Statement on Judicial Review
Ashley Poon
Boston College Law School, ashley.poon@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Agriculture Law Commons, Animal Law Commons,
Environmental Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ashley Poon, The Procedural Impact of an Environmental Impact Statement on Judicial Review, 43 B.C.
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 221 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol43/iss1/9
  221 
THE PROCEDURAL IMPACT OF AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
ASHLEY POON* 
Abstract: On a sunny summer day in 2014, Drakes Bay Oyster Company closed 
its doors to the public, admitting defeat in a years-long fight with the Department 
of the Interior over the renewal of its operating permit. The Secretary of the Inte-
rior believed that the region’s designation as “potential wilderness” under the 
Point Reyes Wilderness Act, along with public policy considerations, obligated 
him to decline renewal of the permit. In producing an Environmental Impact 
Statement regarding the impact of closing the farm, the Secretary procedurally 
insulated his agency decision from later judicial review in Drakes Bay Oyster 
Company v. Jewell. 
INTRODUCTION 
Drakes Estero is a coastal estuary in the geographic and ecological center 
of Point Reyes National Seashore in Marin County, north of San Francisco.1 
The meeting of freshwater runoff with the Pacific Ocean’s saltwater in the es-
tuary creates a biologically diverse environment.2 This mixing of freshwater 
and saltwater is also ideal for oyster farming, which began in the area in the 
1930s.3 
Charles Johnson opened the Johnson Oyster Company in Drakes Estero in 
1954.4 In 1972, Johnson sold his company and a forty-year reservation of use 
and occupancy (the “RUO”) to the United States.5 The RUO ended on Novem-
ber 30, 2012, and stated that upon its expiration “a special use permit may be 
issued for the continued occupancy of the property” and that such a permit “for 
continued use will be issued in accordance with the National Park Service (the 
“NPS”) regulations in effect at the time the reservation expires.”6 Upon expira-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 Drakes Estero Restoration, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/pore/learn/management/
planning_drakesestero_restoration.htm [http://perma.cc/TE58-FMLE]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 4 Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1079 (emphasis omitted). 
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tion of the RUO or its extension, the company was “to remove all structures 
and improvements on the property within 90 days.”7 
On December 17, 2004, Kevin Lunny purchased Johnson’s oyster com-
pany, including his farm.8 Kevin Lunny and his wife Nancy renamed the farm 
Drakes Bay Oyster Company (the “Company”), which eventually produced 
approximately one third of California’s oysters.9 In 2010, Lunny applied for a 
ten-year special use permit to continue operating the state’s largest oyster farm 
by writing to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior (the “Secre-
tary” or “Secretary of the Interior”), Kenneth L. Salazar.10 The controversy 
over the effects of the oyster farm’s operations pits food heavyweights and cul-
inary industry activists against environmental conservationists.11 
Lunny viewed himself as more than a mere farmer, and Drakes Bay Oys-
ter Company as more than a seafood vendor.12 Lunny believed that he was a 
steward of Drakes Estero because he practiced sustainable farming and ranch-
ing, donated oyster shells to habitat restoration efforts in the San Francisco 
Bay, and opened his farm to thousands of visitors for educational tours to in-
crease awareness of the local ecosystem.13 Drakes Bay Oyster Company em-
ployed thirty-one members of the Marin County community, half of which 
lived in affordable housing on-site at the farm.14 The Lunnys asserted that the 
oyster farm provided beneficial ecological services to Drakes Estero by filter-
                                                                                                                           
 7 Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 
 8 Id. 
 9 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d 
972 (No. 13-15227), 2012 WL 6967944, at *1 [hereinafter First Amended Complaint]. 
 10 Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 980. 
 11 See Michael Ames, The Oyster Shell Game, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 18, 2015, 11:49 AM), http://
www.newsweek.com/2015/01/30/oyster-shell-game-300225.html. Alice Waters, along with Tomales 
Bay Oyster Company, a Point Reyes oyster farm, Hayes Street Grill, a restaurant in San Francisco, 
and the following agriculture groups: California Farm Bureau Federation, the Marin County Farm 
Bureau, the Sonoma County Farm Bureau, Food Democracy Now, Marin Organic, and the Alliance 
for Local Sustainable Agriculture, filed an amici curiae brief to support Drakes Bay Oyster Company, 
arguing that closing Drakes Bay Oyster Company would have “broad, negative and immediate im-
pact” on the food industry as a matter of public interest. Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief 
in Support of Appellant DBOC Preliminary Injunction Appeal at 1, Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d 972 (No. 
13-15227), 2013 WL 1212907, at *1. The Environmental Action Committee of West Marin, the Na-
tional Parks Conservation Association, the National Resources Defense Council, Save our Seashore, 
and the Coalition of the National Park Service Retirees filed an amici curiae brief to support the Sec-
retary of the Interior, arguing that the environmental benefits of removing the oyster operations out-
weighed the harm of removal, and that Drakes Bay Oyster Company’s request for injunction should 
be denied because it did not meet its burden of showing how extending the permit was in the public 
interest. See Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Department of the Interior 
Response Brief at 3, Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d 972 (No. 13-15227), 2013 WL 1741902, at *3. 
 12 See Stewardship, SAVE OUR DRAKES BAY OYSTER FARM, http://savedrakesbay.com/core/
stewardship/ [http://perma.cc/65K2-QU23]. 
 13 Id. 
 14 First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, at 1. 
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ing the bay’s water.15 Supporters of the farm’s closure argued that the opera-
tions created a noise disturbance that negatively affected Drakes Estero’s har-
bor seals and birds, left behind plastic debris on the Point Reyes National Sea-
shore’s beaches, and did not contribute to an improvement in water quality.16 
In Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, Drakes Bay Oyster Company ap-
pealed the decision handed down by the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California.17 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court’s verdict upholding the Secretary’s decision to allow the for-
ty-year permit to expire and his order that the Company cease operations by 
denying Drakes Bay Oyster Company’s requested preliminary injunction.18 
The farm’s retail operations and cannery shut down on July 31, 2014, and 
farming ceased on December 31, 2014.19 This Comment argues that the Secre-
tary’s enabling legislation allowed him to decline a permit extension without 
considering the content of the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) be-
cause production of the EIS alone satisfied the “hard look” baseline required 
by an Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) analysis on judicial review, 
thereby precluding the decision from being overturned as arbitrary and capri-
cious.20 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Congress established the Point Reyes National Seashore (the “Seashore”) 
in 1962; the enabling legislation placed the Seashore under the administrative 
authority of the Secretary of the Interior.21 Three years later, California con-
veyed all the land within the Point Reyes National Seashore to the United 
States, and reserved certain minerals rights to itself and the right to fish to Cal-
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Environment and Awareness, DRAKES BAY OYSTER CO., http://www.drakesbayoyster.
com/environment/ [http://perma.cc/35XB-HU74]. 
 16 Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Department of the Interior Response 
Brief, supra note 11, at 15–17. 
 17 Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013). Sally Jewell was sworn 
in as Secretary of the Interior during the course of litigation in April 2013, replacing Salazar. About 
Secretary Jewell, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/whoweare/secretaryjewell 
[https://perma.cc/LNJ9-F36N]. Accordingly, the defendant’s name changed from Salazar to Jewell on 
review in the Ninth Circuit. See FED. R. CIV. P. 25. 
 18 Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1078. 
 19 See About Us, SAVE OUR DRAKES BAY OYSTER FARM, http://savedrakesbay.com/core/about/ 
[http://perma.cc/PL24-FVWM]. 
 20 See infra notes 21–102 and accompanying text. 
 21 Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1078. 
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ifornians.22 In 1976, Congress’s Point Reyes Wilderness Act (the “Act”) desig-
nated certain areas of the Point Reyes National Seashore as wilderness.23 
The Point Reyes Wilderness Act also designated Drakes Estero as poten-
tial wilderness, and granted the Secretary of the Interior discretion to later des-
ignate the area as wilderness.24 The House Committee’s Report regarding the 
Act stated that potential wilderness areas were to be “essentially managed as 
wilderness, to the extent possible,” and required continuous efforts to eliminate 
barriers to converting these lands and waters into full wilderness.25 
In passing the Act, Congress took into account the Department of the In-
terior’s recommendation that the acreage, including the Drakes Estero oyster 
farm, not be designated as wilderness because the “farming operations taking 
place in this estuary and the fishing rights over the submerged lands” made the 
area “inconsistent with wilderness.”26 At the same time that the Point Reyes 
Wilderness Act was passed, Congress indicated that “publication in the Federal 
Register of a notice by the Secretary of the Interior” would convert potential 
wilderness areas into wilderness.27 
Kevin Lunny purchased the Johnson Oyster Company and its reservation 
of use and occupancy permit in 2004.28 Before he closed in escrow on the pur-
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. Wilderness is defined in the Wilderness Act of 1964 as “an area where the earth and its 
community of life are untrammeled by man.” 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012). Such land is designated as 
wilderness for preservation of its physical characteristics which: 
(1) [G]enerally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the 
imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for 
solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand 
acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an 
unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features 
of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value. 
Id. 
 24 Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1079. 
 25 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1680, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5593, 5595. Congress first 
used the term “potential wilderness” in Public Law 94-567 (the “Public Law”) designating the Point 
Reyes National Seashore lands as wilderness and potential wilderness. Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-567, § 3, 90 Stat. 2692, 2693 (1976); Julia Graeser, The Role of (Junk) Science in Wilderness 
Management: Lessons Learned in the Wake of Drakes Bay Oyster Company, 19 HASTINGS W. NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 307, 312 (2013). The Public Law did not define the term at the time. Graeser, 
supra. 
 26 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1680, at 3. 
 27 Act of Oct. 20, 1976, 90 Stat. at 2693. The National Park Service has continued to use the po-
tential wilderness designation: its internal, unofficial management policies state that the label is in-
tended to be a temporary label. See NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006, at § 6.2.2.1 
(2006), http://www.nps.gov/policy/mp2006.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9AM-4J6N]. Congress may author-
ize the potential wilderness to become designated wilderness upon the NPS Secretary’s determination; 
this change in status is to be published in the Federal Register after the nonconforming uses in the 
potential wilderness area have ceased. See id. 
 28 Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
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chase of the farm, the National Park Service met with him and communicated 
the legal history of the area, including its view that it was required by its ena-
bling legislation and management policies to actively seek to convert potential 
wilderness areas, specifically Drakes Estero and the oyster farm, to wilderness 
status by removing “non-conforming conditions.”29 The NPS also communi-
cated that it did not intend to extend the farm’s RUO when it expired.30 
In 2009, Congress reviewed the authority it granted to the Secretary to ex-
tend the RUO.31 Congress stated in Section 124 of the Department of the Inte-
rior Appropriations Act that before the farm’s permit expired on November 30, 
2012, “[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior is authorized to issue a special use permit with the same terms and condi-
tions as the existing authorization . . . .”32 
In 2010, Lunny applied to the Secretary for a ten-year special use permit 
extension.33 In response, the NPS began the National Environmental Policy 
Act (“NEPA”) process for analyzing the environmental impacts of the farm’s 
operations, and released a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (“DEIS”) in 
September 2011.34 Drakes Bay Oyster Company responded with a Data Quali-
ty Complaint, claiming the DEIS’s conclusions were inaccurate.35 Congress 
directed the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) to assess the DEIS.36 In 
August 2012, NAS stated that the DEIS had “a moderate or high level of un-
certainty associated with impact assessments . . . .”37 The NPS published its 
Final EIS in November 2012, which asserted that according to Section 124 of 
the Appropriations Act, the Secretary could make his decision to deny or ex-
tend the permit “notwithstanding” the NEPA analysis and the EIS.38 
One day before the permit’s expiration, the Secretary announced in a 
Memorandum of Decision that he would allow the permit to expire.39 The Sec-
retary did not consider the EIS’s findings essential to his decision; instead, he 
incorporated a balancing test that relied on policy considerations of the NPS’s 
wilderness approach and the congressional intent underlying the Point Reyes 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 980. 
 31 Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 32 Act of Oct. 30, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-88, § 124, 123 Stat. 2904, 2932 (2009). 
 33 Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 980. 
 34 Id. 
 35 First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, at 13. 
 36 Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1081. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 981. 
 39 Id. 
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Wilderness Act.40 The following week, the NPS published a notice in the Fed-
eral Register announcing that Drakes Estero was designated as wilderness.41 
Lunny filed a motion for preliminary injunction requesting that the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California declare the Secre-
tary’s Memorandum of Decision void and unlawful, issue the special use per-
mit he originally requested, and enjoin enforcement of the decision so that the 
Company could continue its operations throughout litigation.42 He argued that 
the Secretary’s decision violated Section 124 of the Department of the Interior 
Appropriations Act, NEPA, and the APA.43 
To obtain injunctive relief, the moving party must establish: “(1) 
[L]ikelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief; (3) showing the balance of the equities tips in its favor; and 
(4) the injunction is in the public interest.”44 The district court denied Lunny’s 
motion finding that Section 124 granted the Secretary full discretion to decide 
whether to renew a permit, which the court could not review under the APA.45 
The court also held that even if it had jurisdiction to review the decision, the 
Company was unlikely to meet the requisite elements to succeed on the merits 
of its motion, nor could it show that the balance of equities tipped in its favor 
such that the court could grant injunctive relief.46 
Lunny appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, arguing that the decision violated NEPA, the Data Quality Act, 
the APA, and the Constitution.47 In Jewell, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s order denying Drakes Bay’s preliminary injunction.48 The Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the district court that Drakes Bay was unlikely to succeed 
in proving that the Secretary violated Section 124, and thus, affirmed the lower 
court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.49 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See id. at 981–82. 
 41 Designation of Potential Wilderness as Wilderness, Point Reyes National Seashore, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 71,826, 71826–27 (Dec. 4, 2012). 
 42 Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 975–76. 
 43 Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 44 Salazar, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 983. 
 45 See id. at 976. 
 46 Id. 
 47 First Amended Complaint, supra note 9. 
 48 747 F.3d at 1078. 
 49 Id. Drakes Bay Oyster Company appealed the district court’s decision to the United States 
Supreme Court, but the writ of certiorari was denied. Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 134 S. Ct. 
2877 (2014). The Company reached a settlement agreement with the NPS in the Northern District of 
California, and closed on December 31, 2014. Mark Prado, Marin Indep. Journal, Drakes Bay Oyster 
Co. Dismantled to Return Farm Site to Nature, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, (Jan. 19, 2015, 8:28 AM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/eat-drink-play/ci_27349076/drakes-bay-oyster-co-dismantled-return-
farm-site [http://perma.cc/E6TR-YBDA]. The NPS is currently creating a restoration plan for Drakes 
Bay Oyster Company’s remaining oyster racks and marine debris. See Drakes Estero Restoration, 
supra note 1. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) was enacted in 1969 
under the Congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy to 
“create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in pro-
ductive harmony.”50 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit emphasized in 1995, “[T]he purpose of NEPA is to ‘provide a mechanism 
to enhance or improve the environment and prevent further irreparable dam-
age.’”51 
NEPA requires agencies to produce an Environmental Impact Statement 
(“EIS”) for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment . . . .”52 Certain environmental actions do not require the 
production of an EIS.53 In 1995, a county in Oregon sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief before the Ninth Circuit in Doulas County v. Babbitt, asserting 
that the U.S. Secretary of the Interior (the “Secretary”) failed to comply with 
NEPA when designating habitat for threatened species under the Endangered 
Species Act.54 The Ninth Circuit found that a proposed environmental conser-
vation effort did not trigger NEPA and therefore did not require an EIS because 
the action “protects the environment from exactly the kind of human impacts 
that NEPA is designed to foreclose.”55 When required, the dual purposes of an 
EIS are to ensure that agencies properly consider the environmental conse-
quences of a proposed action and to keep the public informed of environmental 
impacts of a proposed action.56 
The President’s Council on Environmental Quality (the “CEQ”) oversees 
implementation of NEPA.57 The CEQ issued regulations in 1978 that govern 
agencies’ authority to carry out their obligations under NEPA.58 Specifically, 
the CEQ recognized agencies’ authority to interpret NEPA “as a supplement to 
its existing authority” and to carry out the requirements of NEPA in “full com-
pliance with the purposes and provisions of [NEPA].”59 
The National Park Service (the “NPS”) produces its own agency-specific 
NEPA regulations as updates to its “Directors Order #12: Conservation Plan-
ning, Environmental Impact Analysis, and Decision-making” (the “Order”) 
                                                                                                                           
 50 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2012). 
 51 Douglas Cty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Pacific Legal Foundation 
v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
 52 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See Babbitt, 48 F.3d at 1499. 
 55 Id. at 1507. 
 56 See id. at 1498. 
 57 See 42 U.S.C. § 4344. 
 58 See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (2015). 
 59 Id. 
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and accompanying handbook.60 These documents outline the agency’s ap-
proach to its decision-making process.61 The Order states that the “NPS will 
articulate a reasoned connection between the technical and scientific infor-
mation considered and the final agency action.”62 If this information cannot be 
obtained because it would be too expensive or technically impossible to ascer-
tain, the NPS will identify a proposed alternative.63 If a proposed alternative is 
unavailable, the NPS will follow the CEQ’s regulations and state in the EIS 
that: 
(1) . . . [S]uch information is incomplete or unavailable; (2) . . . the 
relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to evaluating 
reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human 
environment; (3) a summary of existing credible scientific evidence 
which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably foreseeable signifi-
cant adverse impacts on the human environment; and (4) an evalua-
tion of such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research 
methods generally accepted in the scientific community.64 
NEPA functions jointly with the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”) to 
ensure that agencies take a “hard look” at any environmental consequences of 
a proposed action.65  
The APA authorizes judicial review of agency actions, which may be set 
aside if the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.”66 An agency’s decision must be upheld in court as 
long as “the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”67 Given agencies’ 
expertise and experience in regulating their specific areas of industry and 
commerce, a court’s standard of judicial review of an agency action is fairly 
narrow.68 A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency; rather, 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Environmental Planning & Compliance Branch, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/orgs/
1812/epc.htm [http://perma.cc/5YRL-PSZ3]. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Director’s Order #12: Conservation Planning, En-
vironmental Impact Analysis, and Decision-Making § 4.5 (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.nps.gov/
policy/DOrders/DO_12.pdf [http://perma.cc/9BZH-M35X]. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. § 4.6. 
 65 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). The Supreme 
Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. stated that 
NEPA’s “mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.” 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). Because 
NEPA is primarily a procedural statute, a court’s role is merely “to insure that the agency has taken a 
hard look at environmental consequences.” See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 
1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
 66 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 67 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 68 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 (2011). 
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in reviewing a decision, a court must assess “whether the decision was based 
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment” from the agency.69 
The limits of a court’s deference to agency decisions are evident in Blue-
water Network v. Salazar, decided in 2010 by the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, in which environmental organizations challenged 
the NPS’s decision to allow jet skis back into the Gulf Islands National Sea-
shore and the Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore.70 The NPS had conducted 
an Environmental Assessment (the “EA”) analyzing the impacts of jet skis and 
laying out three options for action: allowing jet ski use at the same level, limit-
ing jet ski use, or prohibiting jet ski use entirely.71 The court in Bluewater Net-
work found that the EA was improperly conclusory, and the NPS’s decision to 
allow jet skis in the national parks made pursuant to the analysis of the EA was 
therefore arbitrary and capricious.72 
The United States Supreme Court clarified the scope of judicial review of 
administrative decisions in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe in 
1971 by affirming that a court’s inquiry must be “searching and careful,” and 
stating that the “ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.”73 Private citizens 
and conservation organizations claimed that the Secretary of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation (the “Secretary of Transportation”) violated federal 
statutes that prohibited him from using federal funds to build a highway 
through a public park if a “feasible and prudent alternate route exist[ed].”74 If 
there was no such alternate route, the Secretary of Transportation was permit-
ted to approve the construction of the highway if all possible harm was mini-
mized.75 The Supreme Court found that the Secretary of Transportation’s fail-
ure to make formal findings and state his reasons for allowing the highway’s 
construction, though making judicial review more difficult, did not “necessari-
ly require that the case be remanded to the Secretary.”76 Nevertheless, the Su-
                                                                                                                           
 69 Id. at 477 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983)). 
 70 721 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 71 See id. at 12. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has clarified that “[a]n 
environmental assessment (EA) is a document used to decide whether the environmental impact of a 
proposed action is significant enough to warrant preparation of an EIS.” Douglas Cty. v. Babbitt, 48 
F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). An Environmental Assessment determines if there will be significant 
effects from a federal action, whereas an EIS analyzes and discloses the significant effects known to 
result from a federal action. Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE INTERIOR, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/planning/planning_overview/frequently_asked_
questions.html#12 [http://perma.cc/MP7Q-2E98]. An EA is generally shorter than an EIS, its produc-
tion is less procedurally intensive, and it provides the public with less chance for involvement. Id. 
 72 Bluewater Network, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 38. 
 73 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 74 Id. at 404–05. 
 75 Id. at 405. 
 76 Id. at 417. 
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preme Court ultimately remanded the case because the Secretary of Transpor-
tation was obliged to provide some explanation sufficient to allow the court “to 
determine if the Secretary acted within the scope of his authority and if the 
Secretary’s action was justifiable under the applicable standard” of review.77 
In Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
in 1983, the National Resource Defense Counsel challenged the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission’s (the “NRC”) new rule, which assumed that no environ-
mental impact would result from long-term storage of certain radioactive 
wastes.78 The United States Supreme Court held that the NRC complied with 
both NEPA and the APA.79 The Court’s NEPA and APA analyses were separate 
but related, and did not “impose hybrid procedures greater than those contem-
plated by the governing statutes.”80 The Court held that the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s decision was made with a “self-evident judgment in error,” 
which violated NEPA and failed the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.81 
Specifically, the Court found that if an agency’s decision ignores factors rele-
vant under NEPA with regard to the environmental effects of a proposed ac-
tion, the decision is arbitrary and capricious.82 The Court emphasized that its 
role was not to substitute its own decision-making process for that of the agen-
cy, but rather, to confirm that the agency “considered the relevant factors and 
articulated a rational connection” between the facts and the agency’s ultimate 
decision. 83 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California’s decision that Drakes Bay Oyster Company would likely 
not be able to show that the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior 
(the “Secretary” or “Secretary of the Interior”) violated the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (“NEPA”) in his decision to decline to extend the reserva-
tion of use and occupancy (the “RUO”) permit.84 The Interior Appropriations 
Act’s “notwithstanding” clause applied to conflicting provisions of law: the 
Secretary, in making his decision, was required to take into account statutes 
and regulations that did not conflict with the Section 124 grant of authority to 
extend the permit, but could disregard potentially conflicting statutes or regula-
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. at 420. 
 78 See 462 U.S. 87, 89–90 (1983). 
 79 Id. at 90. 
 80 Id. at 92 (emphasis added). 
 81 Id. at 95–96. 
 82 Id. at 96. 
 83 Id. at 105. 
 84 747 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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tions.85 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in its review of the Secretary’s decision 
should consider Section 124 and any other applicable statutes that did not con-
flict with Section 124.86 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that the Secre-
tary’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious, and that Drakes Bay Oyster 
Company’s “likelihood of success on the merits of [its] claims [was] too re-
mote” to warrant the remedy of a preliminary injunction.87 Following the Ninth 
Circuit’s prior reasoning in Douglas County v. Babbitt that an act that was es-
sentially a conservation act did not trigger NEPA, the court in Jewell held that 
the Secretary’s failure to extend the RUO did not trigger NEPA compliance 
because the removal of the oyster farming operations restored the physical en-
vironment to its natural state.88 
In contrast to the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia’s decision in Bluewater Network v. Salazar, where the court found the Na-
tional Park Service’s (the “NPS”) Environmental Assessment and the agency’s 
later reliance on it both conclusory, the Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary of 
the Interior’s decision with regards to NEPA compliance was acceptable.89 The 
court recognized the Secretary’s acknowledgement that NEPA compliance was 
procedurally “less than perfect,” but this did not amount to prejudicial error 
that would grant Drakes Bay Oyster Company relief under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (the “APA”).90 The court was satisfied that the Secretary con-
sidered the Environmental Impact Statement (the “EIS”) because NEPA does 
not require resolution of all potential environmental consequences.91 In doing 
so, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the NEPA and APA analyses are separate, 
as established in Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, because the court found that the APA arbitrary and capricious stand-
ard does not require flawless NEPA compliance.92 Though the Secretary did 
not consider the EIS’s content crucial to his decision, the Ninth Circuit never-
theless deferred to his expertise.93 
By merely producing an EIS, the NPS ensured that a court would be un-
likely to find the agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious under the APA’s 
standard: the results and recommendations within the EIS are less consequen-
                                                                                                                           
 85 Act of Oct. 30, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-88, § 124, 123 Stat. 2904, 2932 (2009); Jewell, 747 F.3d 
at 1083 (internal citation omitted). 
 86 Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1083. 
 87 Id. at 1085. 
 88 See id. at 1090. 
 89 Compare Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1090–91 (upholding the Secretary’s decision, finding that it met 
the NEPA standard of review and was not conclusory), with Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. 
Supp. 2d 7, 38 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the NPS decision was conclusory). 
 90 Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1090–91. 
 91 Id. at 1091. 
 92 See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 92 (1983); Jewell, 747 F.3d at 
1090–91. 
 93 See Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1091. 
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tial than the process of producing the EIS.94 NEPA compliance and the findings 
of the EIS were, therefore, not essential to the Secretary’s decision because the 
Secretary reasonably relied on the policy and congressional intent underlying 
the 1976 Point Reyes Wilderness Act.95 
The time-consuming, resource-intensive process of producing an EIS is 
nevertheless important because it preemptively ensures that the agency has 
taken a “hard look” at the issue, which effectively insulates the decision from 
being overturned on judicial review.96 Producing an EIS that will not be con-
sidered in the agency’s final decision threatens the dual purpose of the EIS, 
which requires the agency to properly consider the environmental consequenc-
es of a proposed action and keeps the public informed of environmental im-
pacts.97 Although affected parties may remain involved in agency decision-
making by participating in the production of the EIS, they may be excluded 
from administrative decision-making if the EIS is later considered inconse-
quential.98 
In declining to extend the RUO for Drakes Bay Oyster Company, the 
NPS closed a locally beloved institution and expressed its interpretation of leg-
islation regarding permissible commercial activities within a wilderness area.99 
Further, the Ninth Circuit, in upholding the Secretary’s decision and validating 
the decision-making process on the basis of law and policy rather than on the 
findings of the EIS, strengthened the related analyses of APA and NEPA com-
pliance by allowing the procedural production of an EIS alone, rather than its 
substantive scientific findings, to meet the APA’s standard, which requires the 
agency to take a “hard look” at environmental effects of a proposed action.100 
Given the Ninth Circuit’s acceptance of the Secretary’s cursory NEPA 
compliance and his statement that he disregarded the controversial portions of 
the EIS, future cases may follow precedent and defer to agencies’ understand-
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1091; see also 
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release announcing Salazar’s decision, he explained that allowing the permit to lapse was aligned with 
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 100 See Jewell, 747 F.3d at 1086. 
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ing of NEPA.101 This could allow agencies to take advantage of the procedural 
significance of producing an EIS without concern for the scientific findings or 
recommendations contained within the studies and final report.102 
CONCLUSION 
In Drakes Bay Oyster Company v. Jewell, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals’ affirmation of the decision of the Secretary of the Interior (the “Secre-
tary”), allowing the reservation of use and occupancy to expire without materi-
ally considering the Environmental Impact State (the “EIS”) affirms the Na-
tional Park Service’s authority and expertise in its decision-making because the 
court’s interpretation of Section 124’s “notwithstanding” clause enabled the 
Secretary to reach his decision without considering conflicting provisions of 
law. Therefore, regardless of the results and recommendations contained in the 
EIS, the Secretary could have made his decision with the assumption that his 
decision would not fail an Administrative Procedure Act analysis on judicial 
review. Despite the competing and even compelling claims as to the environ-
mental effects of the oyster farm’s operations, the Secretary acted within his 
authority throughout the decision-making process, and the production of an 
EIS effectively insulated his decision from review by meeting the “hard look” 
requirement. 
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